
November 17, 2026
Kaspersky’s GReAT team has disclosed an active cyber-espionage campaign aimed at government organizations in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa. Dubbed Operation ShadowCloud, it relies on two previously undocumented backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor. By routing command-and-control and proxy traffic through GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint, and the Ably messaging service, the attackers blend in with ordinary business traffic and slip past network-based detection.
How the attack starts
The chain begins with the MeshCentral Agent, a legitimate remote-management tool. Kaspersky’s researchers believe the attackers may be reusing existing infections to reach victim environments. Through the agent, they place three files on the machine: a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL, and an encrypted payload. The legitimate program sideloads the DLL, which decrypts the payload using RC4 and XOR operations and launches one of the two backdoors.
GitDoor: GitHub as the control channel
GitDoor receives commands and returns results through GitHub repositories. It supports 26 commands, including file management, keylogging, process injection, registry enumeration, screenshot capture, WhatsApp decryption key extraction, proxying (including through Ably), and loading shellcode. Credential theft with Mimikatz and CookieKatz is also part of the toolkit.
GraphDoor: SharePoint as the staging ground
GraphDoor authenticates through login.microsoftonline.com to obtain access tokens, then uses the Microsoft Graph API to stage commands and data on a SharePoint drive. It downloads plugins on demand for keylogging, process listing, screen capture, and proxying, including an Ably channel proxy.
Who is behind it?
Kaspersky stops short of a firm attribution. On several victim systems, implants from other activity clusters—specifically Bronze Sandcastle, FamousSparrow, and CopperTurtle (also tracked as BlackTech)—shared staging directories with GitDoor and were deployed within a day of it. While that doesn’t prove a direct link, it suggests a Chinese-speaking group may be developing or using the backdoors.
What defenders should do
Watch for unexpected MeshCentral Agent installations and activity. Look closely at endpoint traffic to GitHub, SharePoint, and Ably in places where there’s no business reason for it. Kaspersky has published indicators of compromise to hunt against.
Source: Kaspersky GReAT, “Operation ShadowCloud” (Part 1 and Part 2 on Securelist).

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